One of the most dynamically developing directions in modern linguistics is pragmalinguistics. The researchers interpret various aspects of pragmatic linguistics. According to Y.D Apresyian, the pragmatics is speaker’s (1) true nature; 2) the content of the communication; 3) written convention of the addressee in any language unit (lexema, affix, grammatical syntax). In general, the definitions of linguistic pragmatics in scientific literature can be grouped as follows: 1) explanations that overpass human factor; 2) the definitions of the functional aspect of linguopragmatic researches, their contextual condition: “science of language use”, “language in context”; 3) definitions that focus on studying the effectiveness of language interaction in the context of communicative interaction; 4) definitions that distinguish an interpretive aspect of the speech that is reflected in any communicative context. The interpretation here is pragmatic meaning of the word [1,78].
Materials and methods of research
Pragmatics means “action” in Greek. Hence, its subject is the language in use. In philosophy and psychology, this term is used to refer to action, practice. Linguistic pragmatics is a language that is studied as a means of “use within itself, not for itself”. At present, pragmatics is an inter-sectoral branch, as well as a wide range of logical-philosophical, sociological, psychological, ethnographic, and even cybernetic trends along with all aspects of linguistics. The general theoretical objectives of pragmatics include the development of cognitive modeling, memory modeling, and the model of communicative interaction and models of language use in specific socio-cultural situations. In fact, pragmalinguistics is not yet fully formulated as a science. However, it is clear that its language presence is a research oriented one. This is the need to put human factor first in linguistic research. This idea comes from the idea that it begins with semioticss. Semiotics (Greek symbol) is a science discipline that studies the structure and use of various character systems in the storage and delivery of information. It includes systems that relate to human society, nature, or human beings. In general, knowledge of the language is based on its system structure, i.e. acquisition of grammatical rules, understanding of lexical meaning of words, ability to compose sentences on the basis of syntax, etc. is understood. This is a requirement for traditional linguistics.
And the form of pragmalinguistics is formed according to the requirements of the structural system of the language, but it is possible to distinguish between additional values, depending on the circumstances of the relationship. Well, this room was light, yes? There are a number of things to consider: Firstly, the speaker has never been in this room; secondly, that the other rooms are darker and dingy; thirdly, the speaker wants to make a positive impact on the house owner; fourthly, the speaker takes an interest in the opinion of the house owner, etc. Likewise, the phrase He goes to the race too is that the speaker is disrespectful or surprised; the unexpectedness of which is that he disagrees with him. If we changed that phrase to the race, all of the above values would immediately become relevant. This means that the speaker’s attitude toward him is neutral. Then only particle too is loaded with pragmatic push apart from its grammar service. Therefore, the listener should be aware of the communicative situation in order to understand it correctly. Also, inexpedient tools are very helpful in understanding the pragmatic meaning of each speaker in oral speech. At first glance, speeches in the sense of a straight line with no additional tone can affect the listener. These are issues that arise in connection with the pre-existing situation. At the moment of the word, nothing extra may be meaningless, but only one word may refer to the whole of the communicative relationship. Let’s take an example from the narrative “My name is Kozha” written by B. Sokpakbaev: Young teacher Maikhanova tells the old teacher, “You are big head of science now.” The person who is not aware of the content of the story does not understand the meaning of these words. Indeed, it means that the elderly teacher’s advice on forgiveness of the poor teacher is inappropriate and disagrees with him. Rakhmanov’s words “I could not lead the way to Sultan”, which regretted that a boy named Sultan could not get on well with the others at school and he had left the school. An old teacher blames himself for this situation. And a young teacher who understands a disadvantaged child as the most effective way to drop out of school is fully supported by the same sentence. The problem with the long history of the Sultan was based on a single candle burning compound. A few months later, the teacher fully reflects the past, using a single word. Here’s the point in the pragmatism of the term presupposition. That is, Maykhanova’s unanimous word cannot have any effect on the person who is unaware of the previous part of the work. And its full pragmatic sense can only be understood by a person who is aware of the prior communicative situation. Pragmalinguistics studies these aspects of speech. So, to deliver a particular point of view, a person performs a certain action oriented towards the addressee. This is directly related to the purpose and intent of the speaker. In pragmalinguistics it is called speech acts. Thus, the basic concepts that make up the terminological device of this science are: communicative, addresser, addressee, purpose-and-speech, and presupposition.
Certain situation in which every speech takes place is the situation. It is known that the person needs to speak and communicate with another person. Such a set of circumstances constitutes the notion of intrinsic situation. In the works of pragmalinguists, there are various definitions of affiliation. We find one of them in the book N.I. Formanovskaya: The contingency is a complex that reflects the external conditions of communication and the internal state of the participants in the form of speech and discourse [2,12]. V.G. GAK, I.P. Susov, K.A. Dolinin, and other researchers’ work, the relationships are different, but they can be summarized as the following key components:
– partners and associates in the contingency;
– participatory approach (intention);
– the conditions of contingency (reason, etc.)
Results of research and their discussion
The contingency can be summarized as follows: “I – you – here – at the moment – for the following reason – through the following message or sentence -tell you» [3]. This sequence should be considered conditional. According to each situation, the sequence changes. Generally speaking, speech consists of several stages: stage 1 – preparation for the speech. Here, the speaker is trained internally, assessing what he / she is going to do to convey his / her thoughts, intentions, motives, and previous similar situations. Particularly, in the case of official co-operation, the partner’s age, gender, service, etc. Taking into account the peculiarities of each individual, he / she interprets every word; in stage 2 the speech is structured, i.e. the addressee mimics the phrase, using the words it finds most effective for the most accurate and effective manner of its own approach; during the transition to external words, the built-in speech is sounded or sent to a letter in stage 3. In some instances, the speaker may not be able to extract the entire oral presentation. This makes it difficult for the surrounding audience to understand that the address of this address is irrelevant and distorted. In general, you can see the result of the speech by looking at the address of the addressee. That is, it is possible to say that speaking at the moment of feedback has already taken place. For such a connection, the word must be taken correctly. In other words, the process of adoption consists of several stages: 1) switching from acoustic or graphic code to the internal word code (hearing or perceiving audio or reading messages); 2) analysis and analysis of syntax structures, graphic forms; 3) understanding the general direction of the speech; 4) understanding the meaning and meaning of the speech; 5) evaluation of the received information (content of the speeches, ideas, views and position of the speaker); 6) understanding the reason for the choice of language tools.
It is known that the communicative interaction interacts during the contingency. This can also be divided into several stages: establishing contacts, continuing and stopping communication. During the first set-up period, language and patterns of greetings are used; at the second stage, attention will be paid to issues that are important for stakeholders. Their interests are clearly defined and emotionally discussed, and the participants express their affection for each other. This is a general scheme of our involvement. In fact, the presence can be shorter. For example, in the informal situation, the first or third stage may even be ignored. Of course, it depends on whether the participants are acquainted, intimate, interested, or casual, temporary partners. The correct understanding or misinterpretation of the message delivered by one of the participants relates to several factors.
A combination of these conditions is called pragmatic context in scientific literature. Generally speaking, the content of the conversation type is explicit and confidential. All visible, direct observable explicitly covered. It can be conditionally divided into verbal and non-verbal. And the underlying or hidden context is not directly visible to the eye – the purpose, interests, motives, personality attitudes of participants – in particular the level of education, social status, specifications etc. The result of the speech depends on the results of these terms. The presence of a single type of contingency depends on its basic components. That is, the place and time of the communication is known to the participants, the peculiarities of speech and behavior of the addressee, presence of certain presuppositional properties (interests, interests, goals, knowledge) in the addressee; the message has a specific topic. Thus, the pragmatic context of the phrase is primarily the participants. Therefore, it is desirable to consider these participants as important components of the co-operation situation. We use the communicative approach instead of the term “intention” in pragmalinguistic literature. Firstly, J. Austin’s talents were included in the word of enthusiasm. In general, the aspiration of the participants to express their own intensity, as well as the attempts to express their own mentality, forms the form of speech [4, 98]. In any case, intention is equivalent to pre-thought thinking. Linguistic interaction, usually involving phenomena, is influenced by events, facts, and things. In a word, it can be said to be an environment or external environment. In most cases, the need for communication between people arises from the situation in the environment. For example, if one of the participants thinks that the situation in the environment is uncomfortable, unpleasant or unpleasant; he will try to change the situation immediately. Such motivation is the basis for the intentional intention. In the scientific literature, this term is understood in the version of a collaborative intention (the intention of translating from Latin into the original meaning). Generally, the concept of intention began to be used in philosophical science. The concept of intent is understood as the initial stage of speech in psychology. Later, the word must be in the form of a verbal formulation. And in the linguistic researches, intent is understood as the ultimate idea and intent of the participants. Whatever we say, the person does not start the speech without cause. Every word that comes from the speakers is aimed at achieving some aspect of it. This, in turn, assumes the effectiveness of the partnership. It should be noted that the intention, which is the root cause of the involvement, may be explicitly delivered or presented in a concise manner. That is, in all cases the same speeches do not try to express their intentions. It is likely that an experienced partner will immediately disclose the way in which they come in such a secret form. However, it is common for the inexperienced person to remain in a mysterious way. It is possible to say that in the opinion of the Kazakh people, the ways in which the speaker expresses his intentions, the ways of presenting his way in a more representative way. In particular, it is possible to see a wide range of options, examples between an old man and the youngest, familiar and unfamiliar person, in the story of the girl and the guy secretly delivering intentions. The need to apply such a private conversation may arise in various circumstances. The examples of classical contingency may include the following: to be engaged, to be married off, congratulations, inquiring after health, indicating the direction; looking for the lost object etc. other situations can be illustrated. Typically, forms of intercourse are established in each one of them, which are quite prominent in the Kazakh mentality. At the same time, it should be noted that there are situations in which changing situations arise outside the established pattern. For example, the story of the survivor from the country shows that the tense situation is surprising, not in the typical form. A young man traveling in the early days is a chance comer in a home with a girl. The owner of the house lay the table and puts it in front of the guy. A young fatigued man ran out of the way and drank a hot dish without waiting for the food to cool. When the hot food burst into the mouth, the gentleman looked at the shanyrak and wondered which tree was used to decorate. The young lady who poured tea, responded, “This lilac is a tree of the desert, a mournful man’s spit.” A guy, who is so upset about his behavior and his question, remains silent. And in this situation, the ultimate goal is to say that the concept of absolute is not. That is, the guy was able to come from afar, exhausting his horse and tearing his clothes made an impact to find out which tree it was. Well, the intelligent girl has been so keen on it. Thus, the communicative situation is not always carried out according to a particular scheme. However, it is clear that, depending on the place and time of the engagement, it is possible to plan ahead in advance.
The most common shorthand definition of pragmatics as the study of how language is used can easily be extended in such a way as to include everything that linguists can possibly deal with. Remember that pragmatically oriented students of language felt the need to supplement Chomsky’s dichotomy between competence and performance with the notion ‘competence to perform’, ‘communicative competence’ or ‘pragmatic competence’, the validity of which was even recognized by Chomsky in the following terms:
For purposes of inquiry and exposition, we may proceed to distinguish ‘grammatical competence’ from ‘pragmatic competence’, restricting the first to the knowledge of form and meaning and the second to knowledge of conditions and manner of appropriate use, in conformity with various purposes. Thus we may think of language as an instrument that can be put to use. The grammar of the language characterizes the instrument, determining intrinsic physical and semantic properties of every sentence. The grammar thus expresses grammatical competence. A system of rules and principles constituting pragmatic competence determines how the tool can effectively be put to use.
Most pragmaticians would disagree with this componential presentation because unlike many other tools, language is not a ‘thing’ which leads an independent and unchanging life once it has been ‘made’. It requires constant adaptations to different purposes and circumstances of use. And for a descriptive account of the meaning and an explanatory account of the form of linguistic entities, it is often necessary to refer to conditions of their appropriate use. Strictly speaking, every aspect of competence is part of one’s competence to perform. In other words, also the so-called ‘grammatical competence’ determines the way in which language gets used. Thus the form/meaning vs.use opposition is not unproblematic. While maintaining the contrast, Morris also recognizes this issue when introducing the notion of a ‘pragmatic rule’[5, 162].
Syntactical rules determine the sign relations between sign vehicles; semantical rules correlate sign vehicles with other objects; pragmatical rules state the conditions in the interpreters under which the sign vehicle is a sign. Any rule when actually in use operates as a type of behavior, and in this sense there is a pragmatical component in all rules. But in some languages there are sign vehicles governed by rules over and above any syntactical and semantical rules which may govern those sign vehicles, and such rules are pragmatical rules. Interjections such as ‘Oh!’, command such as ‘Come here!’ value terms such as ‘fortunately’, expressions such as ‘Good morning!’, and various rhetorical and poetical devices occur only under certain definite conditions in the users of the language; they may be said to express such conditions, but they do not denote them at the level of semiosis in which they are actually employed in common discourse. The statement of the conditions under which terms are used, in so far as they cannot be formulated in terms of syntactical and semantical rules, constitutes the pragmatical rules for the terms in question.
This formulation, which places everything that syntax and semantics cannot cope with in the custody of pragmatics, has no doubt contributed to the ‘waste basket’ view of pragmatics.
In the ‘Anglo-American tradition’ pragmatics sometimes looks like a repository of extremely interesting but separable topics such as deixis, implicature, presupposition, speech acts and politeness relevance. More often than not, theoretical unity is provided in spite of the many points of contract between these various topics. Thus, speech act rules are frequently specific applications of the more general conversational maxims. Grice’s account of conversational implicatures and Searle’s definition of indirect speech acts are very similar. Moreover, in his account of the ‘illocutionary derivation’ needed to arrive at the meaning of an indirect speech act, Searle makes explicit reference to the principles of conversational cooperation. Furthermore, there is a fundamental sense in which background information and presupposition are synonymous, though the latter acquired a number of more restricted meanings. And one of the main early definitions of presuppositions advanced in the literature crucially depends on functions of language which are generally discussed in terms of speech acts [6, 112].
The numerous identifiable points of contact have not spontaneously produced coherence in the ‘waste basket’, though truly powerful examples of theory formation have emerged and though interesting and useful attempts have been made even to reduce pragmatics to a single-principle enterprise. A stumbling block seems to have been the persistent attempt to define pragmatics as an additional component of a theory of language, with its own range of topics or even its own units of analysis.
Deixis
In the course of our investigations we have been that the division of labor between semantics and pragmatics when it comes to explaining meaning is far from clear-cut. In the case of presupposition, at least, we have seen that it is perhaps not always possible, or desirable, to describe semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning in entirely separate ways, or even to stipulate which aspects of meaning belong to semantics and which to pragmatics. Presuppositions of simpler sentences are not routinely inherited by, or projected on to, the more complex sentences of which the simple sentences can form a part. It is not that presuppositions never survive when expressions that trigger them are embedded into larger units. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t. This presents a potentially very complex set of data to be explained by a semantic theory.
As examples of complex sentences that don’t inherit the presuppositions of the sentences they contain, consider so-called ‘propositional attitude’ statements. These are the statements that concern an attitude that the subject is said to take towards a particular proposition. The proposition is expressed as an embedded declarative sentence. Example (1) below presupposes (3), because of the existential presupposition that attaches to the use of any singular referring expression, a fact noted by Strawson and indeed by Frege. But if (1) is embedded in a propositional attitude statement as in (2) this presupposition does not survive. Example (2) does not presuppose (3) because it is quite possible that Tharg is entirely deluded. So (2) could still be true even if (3) is false:
1. The Master of the Universe admires Tharg.
2. Tharg believes that the Master of the Universe admires him.
3. There is a Master of the Universe.
Other complex constructions do seem to inherit presuppositions from their constituent parts. Example (4) presupposes (5). This is because it contains the factive verb ‘regret’, which acts as a presupposition trigger. And if (4) appears as the consequent of an ‘if….then’ clause, as in (5), the presupposition is still triggered. That is, (5) presupposes (6); (6) is a necessary precondition for the truth or the falsity of (5):
4. John regrets having invited a famous movie director.
5. If John has invited a film critic to the party, he regrets having invited a famous movie director.
6. John has invited a famous movie director.
The picture that is emerging is one in which some types of complex sentences inherit the presuppositions of their constituent parts while some do not. It might seem that the difference is a fairly easily identifiable property of individual sentence types. And indeed some semantic accounts of presupposition have attempted to include such information.
Implicature
The relevance of the analysis of implicature to micropragmatics is twofold. First, implicature studies account for the further processing of information that has been encoded by the speaker based on his/her presuppositions. Second, in doing the latter, they eventually recognize the contribution implicature makes to the update of the utterance-discourse.
From the analytic standpoint, the explanatory powers of presupposition and implicature are inherently complementary, shedding light on both the speaker and the hearer side of the speech act formation. They are suited to cover, in combination, the whole process of encoding messages by speakers and decoding them by their hearers. This process is essentially a continuum, where making a presupposition paves the way for the utterance before it takes on a linguistic form, in which the presupposition is lexically or non-lexically salient. From that point on, i.e. the point of making the utterance by the speaker, the recovery of the implicature by the hearer may begin – of course, if the hearer senses a prompt to search for it/them. The inference of the implicature, whether in accordance with the speaker’s expectations or not, finalizes the entire process, thus updating the status of the interaction and creating a new contextual basis on which to build presuppositions for further utterances in the exchange. The cycle in question corroborates the dynamic view of context and endorses the intrinsic relativity of the micro-macro dichotomy. While the update takes place, technically speaking, ‘within the utterance’, its effect is on the prospective discourse.
Delving deeper, implicatures created within the boundaries of the utterance are often ‘returned to’ or ‘readdressed’ purposefully later on in the unfolding discourse. Since implicature is rarely encoded in language form, it involves a virtually indeterminable number of more or less complex contextual inferences. As such, it constitutes a valuable rhetorical tool whereby the speaker can control the flow of discourse, adopting his or her consecutive utterances to the current goals. This is due to a central property of implicature, cancellability, which makes it possible for the speaker to deny, at any moment of speech situation, any implicature he or she apparently created. We have seen this property as partly relevant to presuppositions, but it is implicature that permits its broadest manifestation. Indeed, a great many implicatures are cancelled to re-establish adherence to the conversational norms as well as their numerous reformulations and supplements but also to ‘play’ with the addressee, pull a trick on him/her, or simply annoy him/her. Following on this note, many implicatures are cancelled for ironic or sarcastic effects, which are well documented in humor studies. Altogether, the phenomenon of the cancellability of implicature belongs to macropragmatics, since, first, the context that determines the cancellations is made up of a heterogeneous number of social and institutional factors, second, the ‘distance’ between implicature and its cancellation is a matter of discourse, rather than utterance.
Speech acts- towards macropragmatics
The three brief subsections above have shown that deixis, presupposition and implicature make their distinctive micropragmatic contributions to understanding how an utterance is built, what its referents are and how they are encoded, what assumptions are made before the utterance is produced, what effects can be expected after it has been produced and what inferential processes determine these effects. They partake in the process of enacting goals of the utterance, from the speaker’s intention to realize its envisaged function via application of specific indicators of force, to the hearer’s successful recognition of this function and its results. A procedure this complex needs a controlling, ‘umbrella’ parameter of description. It needs a conceptual tool that is able to cover both speaker and hearer related aspects of the utterance function, and, while doing so, draw upon and thus systematize the particular contributions from deixis, presupposition, and implicature in order to make them fit for macropragmatic work at the discourse level. The concept of the speech act seems an excellent theoretical candidate to take up this task.
The orientation of speech acts to both parties of a verbal exchange, as well as to its linguistic matter, is visible at a glance from the traditional distinction between the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary aspects of a speech act. While the locutionary aspect is the most ‘objective’ since it concerns the stable language form of the utterance, the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects involve a dynamic negotiation of meaning between the speaker and the hearer. In saying “It’s hot in here” a speaker may be producing an (implicit) illocutionary act requesting the hearer to open the window, and the perlocutionary act (effect) might be that the hearer indeed opens it, but it might also be that he or she turns on the air-conditioning instead. Thus, the illocutionary-perlocutionary relation not only mirrors the complex process of meaning evolution as sketched at the beginning of this subsection; it also inscribes in the distinction between explicit and implicit ways of communicating a speech act. Consequently, it invokes the notions of deixis, presupposition, and implicature, since they all situate themselves at some specific yet different points of the conceptual axis which links ‘what is said’ with ‘what is effected’.
The classificatory, controlling power of the speech act is further reflected in its network of felicity conditions, i.e. the conditions that underlie a successful, logical, ‘felicitous’ production of different acts. For example, a speaker cannot make a successful order if he or she does not sincerely want the order to be followed, or if he or she deems the hearer incapable of following it. These two felicity conditions are excellent illustrations of the connection that holds between the concepts of the speech act and the other ‘micropragmatic’ concepts – a relation we have postulated at the beginning of this subsection. The speaker’s awareness of cognitive and social context obtaining at the moment of producing a speech act gives rise to pragmatic presuppositions underlying the utterance that contains this act. Then, once the act is accomplished, the speaker’s presuppositions can be assessed against the effectiveness of implicatures they helped to create.
Presupposition
Presupposition can be defined as a mechanism whereby the speaker addresses a body of knowledge and experience, involving both linguistic and non-linguistic contexts, which he or she assumes to be common to him/herself and the hearer. The assumption of the existence of the shared knowledge may cause the speaker not to grammaticalize it in the utterance. This characterization takes presuppositionto be a phenomenon lying at several intersections: the encoded and the assumed, the semantic and the pragmatic, the linguistic and the non-linguistic.
Presupposition comes in contact with deixis on the plane of its partial anchoring in lexical and structural forms. However, since many instances of presupposition can only be approached with reference to context, presupposition also reaches out in the direction of the implicit, constituting, in a sense, a shared knowledge prerequisite for a communicating messages whose final destination is their inference by the hearer. Hence its feasible combination with the apparatus of implicature and, altogether, its relevance to the hierarchy of micropragmatic analysis, which derives its output from both accumulation and interaction of descriptions offered by the individual conceptual tools. As one of the latter, presupposition targets the communicative act at the stage where it develops ‘upwards’ from the lexicogrammatical coding of context to its further abstraction and elaboration by the speaker, with a view to producing a speech act. Throughout this stage, the speaker ‘decorates’ the deictic framework of the utterance with instantiations of knowledge shared by the speaker and the hearer with regard to all entities indexed, referred to, or implied in the utterance.
Traditionally, the more a presupposition was linked with a lexical item or a linguistic construction generating it, the more it was treated as a semantic phenomenon; the other cases deemed ‘pragmatic’ and worth less attention precisely because of the absence of fixed language forms responsible for enacting particular presuppositions. This view has produced multiple typologies of presupposition, based on its embedding in lexicogrammatical forms called presupposition triggers. Furthermore, a number of properties have been assigned to presuppositions, including cancellability and constancy under negation.
From the perspective of micropragmatic analysis oriented toward the speech act characterization of the function of the utterance, as well as the macropragmatic perspective of the discourse, a rigid distinction between semantic and pragmatic presupposition semms far from necessary. It offers little explanatory power compared to an integrated, global view of presupposition as a concept which should be studied against the utterance and discourse goals it serves. Such a view is quite naturally pragmatic, because even though there are specific lexical items associated with specific assumptions, their descriptive capacity does not expire within the structural boundaries of the linguistic expression. On the contrary, their significance goes much beyond as they are able to combine with primarily experiential premises and thus successfully contribute to a network of contextual, often non-linguistic beliefs making up the entire load of knowledge shared by the speaker and the hearer.
Most communicative goals served by presupposition have to do, in one way or another, with economy of expression, though the latter is rarely the only goal sought. If a speaker could not rely on shared assumptions, the lexical and grammatical load of his/her utterance would grow in size, potentially obstructing its comprehension. Although economizing on the linguistic form for the benefit of unobstructed communication could be an utterance goal in itself, it is often a contribution to a larger utterance or discourse function. This becomes clear when analyzing, at the macro level, a series of utterances containing consecutive acts of adjustment to shifting discourse expectations. If I am overweight and say ‘I started jogging after visiting my doctor’ and my confession meets with a blatant attack like “So I took you going to the doctor’s to work out like you should”, I can always follow a defense line in continuing “Well, to be honest, I tried to do some jogging a few times before, but now I do it regularly”. Since the short form of the initial utterance makes it undetermined in terms of meaning, the denial of the ‘only then and never before’ presupposition comes rather easy, contributing to the overall explanation and justification.
Conclusion
Ultimately, there are two types of intentions in language communication: 1) the speaker’s initial approach; 2) a suddenly emerged situation later. It should also be noted that the intent is adaptive, inconstancy. In the end, it is lawful for each of the participants to have their own objective in each particular situation and to try to harmonize the story with their own approach. The reason is that each participant has the goal of speaking effectively. Thus, the bases for describing the concept of the participatory approach can be summarized as follows: 1) the aim of the intentional intentions is direct and indirect; 2) implication and explicit intensities due to introspection or intentional representation of the intention during the conversation; 3) intentional (mentally) intentions, which are carried out due to the motivation of any actors to act; 4) positive and negative intensities in terms of emotional impact on participants; 5) intensification of the short-term or event-related events, due to the cause of development or development. Thus, intention is an important factor that stimulates the realization of any cooperative situation.
Neither general pragmatics nor linguistic pragmatics examine its objects of investigation in isolation but rather focus on their conditions of use, the connectedness with their surroundings, and the necessary and sufficient conditions which assign the object, e.g. intentionality, rationality, model use or action, the status of a particular object and make it count as that object. While general pragmatics concentrates on the analysis of these fundamental premises of practical action, identifying their necessary and sufficient conditions, linguistic pragmatics establishes the explicit connection between those foundations and their language-specific and language-use specific constraints and requirements.
The work is submitted to the International Scientific Conference “Development of Scientific Potential of Higher Education”, UAE (Dubai), March 4-10, 2018, came to the editorial office оn 19.02.2018.